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Hegel distinguishes between humans and animals on the basis that animals, like 
barbarians, lack self-reflection, and are driven by appetite rather than will or 
spirituality. The will, reason, and self-reflection are all different aspects of 
consciousness which enable it (and are enabled by it) to leave its state as an alienated 
thing in-itself and to reconcile its particularity with the universal. This reconciliation, 
which essentially takes place through intersubjective recognition, is for Hegel, what 
grounds the law’s authority and legitimacy. In other words, what lends law its 
authenticity and legitimacy for the subject is the way in which it unfolds as a part of 
consciousness’ own becoming in relation to others. Other human subjects that is, and 
the tenaciousness of the divide between humans and animals, between barbarian and 
civilised subjects, between man and woman in Hegel’s thought provides an entry 
point into a series of questions about how to read Hegel, and the implications of our 
choices for considering the significance of Hegel’s theory of law to current political 
circumstances.   
 
Hegel’s Laws offers a wonderfully accessible account of Hegel’s philosophy of law as 
it simultaneously emerges from and is grounded in this phenomenology of 
consciousness. Conklin renders this account by situating Hegel’s philosophy of law 
and the state firmly within Anglo-American jurisprudence. Raz, Hart, and Dworkin 
are positioned by Conklin as Hegel’s interlocutors with regards to the fundamental 
question at the heart of Conklin’s exposition of Hegel’s thought: what authority 
grounds the law?  
 
Conklin provides the answer to this question by unfolding key aspects of Hegel’s 
dialectical logic as it pertains to the relationship between self-consciousness and the 
realisation of authentically universal laws and the organic formation of Hegel’s ideal 
state form. Conklin emphasises the significance of intersubjective recognition, and the 
fundamental refusal of a priori concepts (of ‘law’ or ‘right’ for instance) to Hegel’s 
schema of law and the state. One of the many strengths of the book is that Conklin 
explicates in very clear detail how for Hegel, the notion that the legitimacy of law 
could be grounded in concepts such as virtue, a notion of the Good, or (even) rights, 
as external to human experience is anathema (56). This is the central plank of 
Conklin’s positing of Hegel as a strong critic of legal formalism.  
 
The legal rule (or the law) is posited in the consciousness of the individual through 
successive movements of consciousness, through its own becoming. Conklin explains 
this phenomenon through an examination of The Philosophy of Right, although his 
reading is informed by Hegel’s philosophical work much more broadly. Conklin sets 
out the transitions from the abstract rights of property and contract law, to the realms 
of the family and civil society, to ultimately, the organic constitution of the ideal state 
form. By showing the reader how individual self-consciousness is embroiled within 
and shapes each of these institutions and sets of relations, Conklin is able to 
illuminate how Hegel’s theory of law, reflected in Hegel’s particular use of the word 
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Recht, embodies as a totality “[t]he whole social, religious, moral, political and les 
lois (in the sense of particular rules) elements [sic] of the ethos.” (44)  
 
The central problematic of law’s legitimacy and the force that authorises the law is 
manifest, quite crucially for Hegel, in the opposition between the romanticist 
emphases on the communal will of the Volk as the grounds for law and the Kantian 
idealism that posits legitimacy as external to legal phenomena (149). Hegel’s attempts 
to shatter the abstract idealism of Kant and Fichte with a notion of consciousness that 
uncovers and actualises its own objectivity is what underlies Hegel’s rejection of a 
formalist position that places the grounds for law’s legitimacy as external to the 
realisation of those very laws. Some other framework of the individual’s relation to 
the legal rule, custom or policy was required, in Hegel’s view, to account for how law 
could be binding on the individual in a rather more authentic way than through mere 
force or violence. Conklin emphasises that for Hegel, reciprocal recognition of 
consciousness with ‘the’ or ‘a’ stranger is what grounds this other framework, this 
alternate account (150). In order for the law to reflect values that the individual 
accepts as authentically or genuinely binding, the laws must “presuppose social 
recognition amongst strangers” (150). 
 
The book is structured as a progression through the various chapters of The 
Philosophy of Right. If this structure sounds linear and teleological, as Hegel’s own 
dialectical logic is often understood to be, Conklin reminds us that for Hegel, the 
experience of time-consciousness is central to the activity of thought for 
consciousness (56). We could go further and observe, as Malabou does, that the 
Hegelian subject actually temporalises itself through this experience of time-
consciousness; on this view, recognition, for instance, becomes a momentary event 
which is then surpassed rather than functioning as an end point or final objective in 
and of itself (Malabou, 2005). In any event, it is the role of the philosopher to 
understand this temporal aspect of becoming, its experiential dimension, and to 
acknowledge that the experience of previous states of being remains as an impression, 
or germ, within subsequent moments of being and becoming. On this basis, Conklin 
argues that for Hegel, unlike Hart, the “‘prelegal’ bodily and ritualistic character [of] 
a prelegal tribal culture is continued and concealed in the formalism of legal culture” 
(62).  
 
Thought is the primary form of action and the means of giving shape and substance to 
history, justice and the law (62), which means that forms of the prelegal, barbarism 
and animality co-exist with higher forms of development and civilisation.  Africans 
and Native American tribes exist as inferior, “physically and spiritually impotent” and 
passive beings, more like animals than humans (65). While the African, or the slave 
have the capacity to become more fully conscious, and barbarism was not confined to 
the world outside of Europe, the way in which Hegel’s attribution of barbarity and 
animality to the non-European world was mapped spatially onto the globe during the 
history of colonialism and imperialism does beg at least a few questions about the 
relationship between the rather obvious problems with Hegel’s account of the 
development of consciousness and the architecture of his concepts.  
 
To paraphrase  Ferreira da Silva (2007), how could the mutual and self-recognition of 
consciousness(es) as beings that are constituted by their relation to the Universal 
(Spirit) be confined to “particular human beings located in a rather small corner of the 
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globe?” (86) Ferreira da Silva offers an answer to this question through a novel 
exploration of the way in which Hegel’s philosophical subject (affected by interaction 
with Kant, Herder, and others) relates to the social subject of a post-Enlightenment 
scientific apparatus that employs the tools of the racial and cultural in such a way so 
as to literally write the differences between the civilised subject and the barbarian 
onto different parts of the globe.  In Ferreira da Silva’s view, interiority and 
exteriority (the inner and particular versus the external and universal) are analytical 
tools employed to delimit the spatial- temporal boundaries within which 
consciousness achieves its reconciliation with the Universal. The positing of 
consciousness that temporalises itself in a non-linear telos yet coincidentally finds its 
home in post-Enlightenment Europe is a masterful example of the cunning or ruse of 
Hegel’s reason. 
 
While the figure of the slave has the capacity to throw off his chains, Hegel’s account 
of Universal History and the hierarchy of civilisations discussed by Conklin reveals 
the flaws in the architecture of Hegel’s concepts of consciousness and being. This 
interjection is not of course about pointing out the banal Eurocentrism or patriarchal 
aspects of Hegel’s treatment of non-European men and (all) women; it is about his 
concepts of consciousness and being in themselves, and raises the question of how to 
read Hegel. Do we accept the stage that he has set up to unfold his unique and 
complex drama of becoming as given, or do we examine the mirror image held up by 
the likes of Marx, Nietzsche, Derrida,  Deleuze, Butler and others, which reveal the 
set up as a ruse of sorts? And, what does this primary question have to do with 
Hegel’s theory of law? 
 
Returning to the invocation of the human/animal dichotomy noted at the beginning of 
the review, which is central to Hegel’s conception of self-consciousness, how does 
remaining faithful to Hegel’s conceptual apparatus continue to render particular 
beings and non-beings invisible? How does a certain distribution of sense (Rancière, 
2006) that seems embedded in Hegel’s thought prolong the life of a conceit of reason? 
How might we laugh at Hegelianism, as an expression of rupture (albeit an anguished 
one) with his “techniques, ruses, strategies, texts” once we have fully acknowledged 
and ingested them (Derrida, 2002, 319)? In other words, might we, in light of these 
critiques, consider how to read Hegel against Hegel? 
 
The animal/human distinction that Conklin describes, for instance, does more than 
reflect a species-ism that is quite untenable in light of biotechnological un-doings of 
the human subject. The distinctions between man and woman, barbarian and civilised 
subject, are based on a dialectical logic that precludes a consideration of multiplicity; 
precludes a consideration of the gap between the concept of self-consciousness and 
actual beings. The crucial gap between the concept of this subject and its ghostly 
matter is swallowed up by, amongst other things, a very particular notion of 
mediation; one which binds the subject to a relentless oscillation between necessity 
and contingency, and continually seduces this subject into a competition for mastery 
that is always, already the game on offer. 
 
The dialectical opposition of two beings, always a double signification for Hegel that 
is at the heart of his philosophy of recognition (we are in relation to each other but for 
me, this relation is also a self-relation reflected through you), is mediated by a 
concept. The third, or mediating concept, exists between the knower and the thing 
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itself. Only a human being (the self-conscious being) can confer form on a thing. So 
for instance, “property is a concept that is superimposed (in thought) upon an external 
thing” (Conklin, p. 120). The person is the only legitimate subject who can confer or 
impose the concept of property on a thing, or more generally, confer meaning on a 
passive, external thing, considered to be a product of nature, nullius.  
	  
Thus, any sort of triangulation can only ever be productive with the will asserting 
form onto something. This concept of the will is premised on a particular 
understanding of human agency: driven by desire, constrained by necessity and 
subject to the whims of the contingent. To borrow from Latour, “[one] should never 
predetermine the weight of what counts and what does not, of what is rhetoric and 
what is essential, what depends on Cleopatra’s nose and what resists all 
contingencies!” (Latour, 1991, 116). In other words, the dialectical motor-force that 
turns what appears to be necessary into something contingent and vice-versa, leaves 
little space for attributing power and agency to the porosity and the ambiguity of 
concepts that make facts and meaning.  
 
This subject creates the conditions of his existence without risking the absolute 
(death), or shifting to a non-modern framework, without accounting for its radical 
inter-dependence and co-existence with non-human beings and matter. Rather, the 
Hegelian subject remains on territory in which a technology of mastery, of certainty 
(or absolute knowledge) is always already the end goal. To return to the primary 
question about Hegel’s theory of law, we might want to ask how the subject who lies 
at the heart of his legal system confounds more radical forms of alienation that might 
account for the porosity (as Buck-Morss suggests) that permeates our understanding  
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